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Theoretical Implications from 
Protocol Analysis on Testing 
and Measu rement 
K. Anders Ericsson 
University of Colorado at Boulder 
One of the goals of psychology has always been to describe, understand, and 
measure individual differences. The diversity of human behavior makes it partic-
ularly challenging to seek to identify general and stable underlying elements that 
correspond to systematic individual differences . A major problem in the efforts 
to identify such elements is that the elements cannot be observed directly. The 
primary method has been to use the current psychological theory to develop 
procedures to measure such hypothetical elements. In this chapter I present a new 
theoretic framework, based on verbal reports from subjects , for identifying and 
measuring individual differences. I argue that this framework is superior to the 
previous ones; hence, I briefly review some of the earlier approaches to measure-
ment of individual differences. 
When scientific psychology was first established over 100 years ago , the 
predominant method of investigation consisted of eliciting introspective verbal 
reports from trained observers. During the introspective era, the research was 
directed toward uncovering the basic sensations and cognitive processes that 
provided the building blocks of the varied and complex human experiences. 
Within this theoretical perspective, it was assumed that observable individual 
differences in normal cognitive functioning were a consequence of differences in 
basic cognitive processes. It was furthermore assumed that individual differences 
in performance on simple tasks, like simple reaction time, letter cancellation , 
and sensory discrimination, would directly reflect individual differences in the 
corresponding basic processes. However, the first studies of individual dif-
ferences on simple tasks showed disappointingly low correlations among tasks as 
well as to grades in school and other indices of ability (Guilford , 1967) . 
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Particularly damaging for this view of simple tasks reflecting basic processes 
was the finding that substantial improvement in performance was observed with 
practice (Binet cited in Varon , 1935). Although subsequent successful attempts 
to measure intelligence reliably relied almost exclusively on complex tasks in-
volving comprehension, the view that individual differences are due to dif-
ferences in basic processes was never completely discarded. Exceptional ability 
(exceptional memory) was consistently interpreted as a result of differences in 
such basic processes . 
The behavioristic era had interesting implications for measurement, in that a 
theory of cognitive structures was explicitly rejected. Among extreme behav-
iorists, all individual differences were attributed to differences in learning, or 
exposure to relevant experiences. Hence, measurement of basic cognitive func-
tions would be meaningless. The measurement of individual differences in com-
plex tasks had to be conducted in an inductive mode, where stable patterns of 
individual differences were discovered empirically rather than deduced the-
oretically. Lacking a cognitive theory, a general theory of measurement was 
developed and refined through the years. This theory of measurement was incor-
porated as an integral part of the methodology of experimental psychology. A 
central problem with the behavioristic approach was to understand what the 
observed performance on a test actually measures. 
Using the computer as a metaphor, theories of human information processing 
were proposed in which the focus was placed on the intermediate processing 
stages necessary to produce observable behavior. Many of the old concepts of 
attention and different types of memory stores were reintroduced in these theo-
ries with more explicit definitions and characteristics. The emphasis of these 
models on process rather than final responses led to a concern for observations 
providing information about the process, like latencies , eye-fixations, and verbal 
reports. It became important to use converging evidence from many different 
types of observations to identify the ongoing cognitive processes . 
For the purpose of this chapter one could divide contemporary cognitive 
research into the mainstream of cognitive psychology , which only uses tradi-
tional performance measures, like accuracy and latency, and other research 
emphasizing supplementary data on the cognitive processes, like eye-fixations 
and verbal reports. The aim of the first category of research has been to provide a 
finer grain analysis of what the psychometric test measures. Some of this re-
search has measured individual differences on tasks assumed to provide pure 
measures of critical capacities according to current cognitive theory. These pure 
measures were then related to compound abilities like verbal IQ (Hunt, 1978). 
Other researchers, notably Sternberg (1977) , have analyzed the latencies and 
errors for performing tasks similar to test-items on psychometric tests, to identify 
measurements of critical information processes. In both the above approaches the 
composite performance (reaction time and accuracy) is factored into components 
using theoretical assumptions, which cannot be directly tested and evaluated 
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within this framework. At least one of the reasons for the remarkable impact of 
these theoretical efforts on research on individual differences and testing is the 
methodological compatibility between test theory and these theories of cogni-
tion. 
Another research approach within cognitive psychology has been directed 
toward understanding the detailed structure of cognitive processes. The aim has 
been to develop models of cognitive processes at a level where one can simulate 
the observable behavior of subjects by a computer program . The pioneering work 
of Newell and Simon (1972) showed that building such models required very 
detailed information about subjects' cognitive processes . The method used by 
Newell and Simon (1972) to elicit such detailed knowledge about subjects' 
cognitive processes was to instruct subjects to "think aloud," i.e., verbalize 
their thoughts, as they solved the presented problems. In a recent review of 
research using verbal reports, Ericsson and Simon (1984) showed that this meth-
odology has been successfully applied to research problems in all major areas of 
psychology- memory, decision-making, educational psychology, instruction, 
and clinical psychology . Although much of that research has implications for 
measurement of individual differences, I know of only a limited number of 
studies using verbal reports of cognitive processes to directly address issues of 
measurement and assessment of individual differences. 
AN OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER 
The goal of this chapter is to argue for the importance of verbal report data in 
understanding what current psychometric tests actually measure and for the 
usefulness of verbal report data in the design of future test instruments. The 
argument has three parts. First, I need to present a convincing case that particular 
kinds of verbal reports provide valid data and that a rigorous methodology for the 
analysis of verbal reports is available. Then, I present a theoretic framework that 
relates verbal report data to other , more traditional kinds of data, like correctness 
of response and latency. Finally, I show that studies using verbal reports have 
significantly altered our understanding of the processes measured by prevailing 
tests . 
The chapter has three major sections that roughly correspond to the different 
parts of the argument. The first section provides an introduction to how verbal 
reports on cognitive processes can be used as valid data. This section summarizes 
my work with Herbert Simon (Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1984) and describes a 
model of how some types of verbal reports yield reliable data on the sequence of 
thought in tasks. 1 briefly show how these forms of verbal reports differ from 
other disreputable forms of verbal reports, like introspection and rationalization. 
The second section presents a theoretical framework for identifying and en-
coding sequences of cognitive processes from verbal reports . Hence, protocol 
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analysis provides a tool for gaining empirical data on the sequence of cognitive 
processes elicited in a given task for a certain subject. Such data is shown to give 
us an empirical method for determining what process or sequence of processes 
are mediating performance in a test. Theoretical assumptions of mediating pro-
cesses can therefore be empirically evaluated in a more direct manner. This 
section also describes inductive approaches, where important cognitive processes 
are abstracted from the verbal protocols to give generalizable accounts of cog-
nitive mechanisms in different domains. 
In the final section, I illustrate how verbal reports have extended our under-
standing of individual differences. For example, within the context of tests 
measuring spatial ability, I demonstrate differences in strategies used by subjects 
of high- and low-spatial abi lity and how verbal reports can improve our under-
standing of what available psychometric tests actually measure. In another exam-
ple, I show how verbal reports can give insights into the structure of practice-
effects and the structure of exceptional memory. 
Let me first turn to an introduction to the analysis of verbal reports on 
cognitive processes. 
PROTOCOL ANALYSIS AND VERBAL REPORTS 
The use of verbal reports on cognitive processes has a long history filled with 
many methodological controversies. The early pioneers of psychology used in-
trospective reports in an attempt to describe the sensory images underlying 
perception and thinking. Following several contradictory findings by different 
research laboratories, the introspective method was seriously criticized. Many 
moderate psychologists (for example, Woodworth, 1938) suggested that intro-
spective analysis (which directed attention toward underlying sensations) was 
misguided, and said this method should be replaced by verbal reports that ex-
pressed thoughts . A careful historic review shows that the founder of behav-
iorism, Watson, rejected introspection, but accepted verbalization of thinking . In 
fact, Watson (1920) was the first investigator to publish an analysis of the 
verbalized thoughts of a subject while he was "thinking aloud." Even so, the 
rejection of introspection by behaviorists was so complete that it generalized to 
any use of verbal reports. 
With the emergence of information-processing models of cognition, several 
researchers started to consider verbal reports as a means to get more direct and 
detailed access to the cognitive processes of subjects. In contrast with most early 
introspective studies, these investigators collected extensive performance data 
and hence were able to evaluate the veridicality and converging validity of verbal 
reports. With his ~ewly developed blank-trial technique, Levine and his associ-
ates (Frankel, Levine, & Karpf, 1970; Karpf, & Levine, 1971) showed essen-
tially perfect correspondence between verbally reported concepts and specific 
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judgments about instances. In studies of memory, subjects' verbal reports on 
mediating associations were found to have remarkable effects on memory perfor-
mance (for a review see Montague , 1972) . Newell and Simon's (1972) analyses 
of verbal reports during problem solving was the most extensive and intensive 
use of such data . On the basis of verbal reports they were able to construct 
computer programs powerful enough to both solve problems and regenerate 
essential aspects of the reported thought processes. Newell and Simon (1972) 
instructed their subjects to verbalize their thoughts concurrently , i.e., "think 
aloud," whereas subjects in the memory studies often recalled their thoughts 
retrospectively . Other investigators using other kinds of instructions found that 
subjects giving verbal reports performed differently from subjects who were not 
required to give verbal reports- thus throwing some doubt on the validity and 
representativeness of verbalized thought. 
The basic concern of Ericsson and Simon (1980) was to propose a model in 
which the cognitive processes responsible for verbalization of thoughts in atten-
tion(heeded thoughts) could be explicated . In its most general and abstract form , 
information processing theory (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Newell & Simon, 
1972; Simon, 1979) postulates that a cognitive process can be seen as a sequence 
of internal states successively transformed by a series of information processes. 
Moreover, each of these success ive states can be described in large part in terms 
of the small number of information structures, or chunks, attended to, or avail-
able in the limited-capacity short-term memory store (STM). Information in the 
vast long-term memory (LTM) and in the sensory memories (of brief duration) 
can be accessed, but the results of these access processes will be attended to 
(heeded) and available in STM. In Fig . 6.1 I have illustrated a sequence of 
successive states, showing how new thoughts are expressed verbally as they 
enter attention , and hence become observable as verbalization segments. 
The general relation between heeded thoughts, i.e., thoughts in attention , and 
the observable verbalizations is much easier to understand in the context of 
specific examples. In Table 6. I , the thinking-aloud protocol of a subject men-
tally mUltiplying 36 times 24 is given. Most of the verbalized information con-
sists of generated intermediate steps, like "4," "carry the 2," "144." There is 
no difference in principle between these intermediate steps and the final result , 
"864." Even when one asks students to answer questions like, "What is the 
number of windows in your parents house?," their thinking-aloud protocols are 
remarkab ly similar. A representative example of such a thinking-aloud protocol 
STM STM ST M STM 
FIG . 6.1 . A thought process repre-
~ sen ted as a sequence of states of SI S3 ••• heeded information. Each state is as-soc iated with verbali zation of new in-
formation entering attention. Verb- I Verb-2 Verb - 3 Ve rb - N 
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TABLE 6. 1 
A Transcript of a Thinking -Al oud Protocol From a Subject 
Mental l y Multiplying 36 Times 24 
OK 
36 times 24 
um 
4 times 6 is 24 
4 
carry the 2 




2 times 6 is 12 
2 
carry the 1 




144 plus 72 








On the right side, the same mult iplication is performed 
us ing the traditional paper and pencil method. 
is given in Table 6.2. Notice that the subject verbally expresses intermediate 
steps (heeded thoughts) rather than explaining or describing her thought proces-
ses. 
From this model of concurrent verbalization it is clear that the subject has to 
have time to complete the verbalization of the heeded information before new 
thoughts enter attention. For tasks where subjects have extensive experience, the 
TABLE 6.2 
A Transcript of a Thinking - Al oud Protoco l From a Subj ect 
Recal l ing t he Number of Windows in Her Pa rent's House 
Let ' s see , there's 3 windows in the living room, 
3 windows in my room, 1 in the bathroom , 2 in the 
sewing room; that's 5 and 3 , 6, 7, 8 , 13--4 in the 
kitchen which would make 17; 3. , 4 in the TV room 
which would make 21 , 2 in my brother ' s room, 23 ; and 
1 in the upstairs bathroom, 24 ; and 3 in my parent ' s 
room, 27 ; and then 1 in the attic , 28 
Adapted from Ericsson and Simon (1984). 
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sequence of thoughts is so closely connected that a concurrent sequential ver-
balization of the spontaneously occurring thoughts is not possible. In such situa-
tions, the subjects can report their thoughts in retrospect by recalling the se-
quence of thoughts just after the completion of the task. When the time taken to 
complete the task is relatively short (about 5-30 seconds) our model predicts a 
rather complete retrospective report of all heeded thoughts . For tasks with longer 
duration, concurrent reports (thinking-aloud) will be more detailed than the 
corresponding retrospective reports. 
One would not expect either retrospective reports or thinking-aloud protocols 
to change the cognitive processes under study . If the essence of the cognitive 
process is the sequence of heeded information , then thinking-aloud doesn' t 
change that sequence. A large number of studies have compared subjects think-
ing aloud with silent subjects doing the same task (for a review see Ericsson & 
Simon, 1984). None of these studies has shown evidence for changes in structure 
of the process due to thinking aloud , as measured by ability to solve problems , 
type of solution , eye-movement pattern , etc . Several studies have shown that 
subjects thinking aloud take more time than silent control subjects. This follows 
from our model, because verbally expressing a thought takes additional time. 
A recent analysis (Deffner & Ericsson, 1985) of the temporal structure of 
subjects thinking aloud showed that they verbalize their thoughts rapidly in 
speech bursts (at 100- 150 words per minute), while most time is spent in 
silence. If the time spent actively verbalizing is measured and then subtracted, 
the mean solution time is no different for silent and think-aloud subjects. Hence, 
it appears that the effect on solution time can be accurately predicted by assum-
ing a local slowing-down of cognitive processes during verbalization . 
Ericsson and Simon 's (1980, 1984) analysis of studies that do show effects of 
concurrent verbalizing demonstrates that these studies used quite different in-
structions to subjects. Typically , subjects are required to verbalize motives or 
reasons for their actions and thoughts. From subject's thinking-aloud protocols 
on the same or similar tasks we know that only a subset of the generated thoughts 
are based on deductions or retrievals with explicit premises verbalized . Forcing a 
subject to provide reasons for all reported thoughts would therefore clearly 
change' the subject's thought processes. This means, of course, that the sequence 
of heeded thoughts is changed , which in turn influences performance and the 
structure of the solution process. For example, many students are accustomed to 
the situation of solving a mathematics problem at the blackboard in front of class . 
Some subjects confuse the instruction to think aloud with such a systematic 
generation of explanations, and investigators of mathematical problem solving 
explicitly tell subjects: " Do not try to explain anything to anyone else. Pretend 
there is no one here but yourself. Do not tell about the solution but solve it" 
(Krutetskii , 1976, p . 93). It is useful to give subjects "warm-up" tasks, where 
thinking aloud is particularly easy . Examples of such tasks are mental multiplica-
tion and anagram problem solving. 
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In a well-known paper criticizing the validity of verbal reports, Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977) showed that in many studies of social psychology, subjects report 
incorrect reasons in response to why-questions. For example, a subject selecting 
among a set of displayed stockings will argue, if asked , that the selected stocking 
is better in terms of some of its physical attributes. Such reasons are given by 
subjects even when the displayed stockings are identical , although they are not 
informed of that. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) argued that in responding to the 
why-question , subjects do not try to remember their thoughts while the associ-
ated behavior was generated, but theorize and try to infer reasons for their 
behavior. Our model of verbal report is consistent with Nisbett and Wilson 's 
argument as · long as the subjects generate the incorrect reasons without recalling 
their corresponding thoughts during the task . 
In some situations, the why-question is asked after such a delay following the 
corresponding behavior that subjects cannot recall their thoughts or are not 
willing to spend the effort required for successful retrieval. In other situations, 
the behavior is elicited without mediating thoughts and hence there are no 
thoughts to be retrieved and used in answering the why-question . For example, 
when normal subjects generate a word starting with "a," a high proportion 
simply report that "apple" emerged. When you ask such subjects why they 
generated "apple" rather than any of the other words starting with "a," they 
may not be unwilling to speculate. Often they suggest that perhaps they learned 
the association between "a" and "apple" while learning the alphabet. Re-
gardless of the truth of these subjects' hypothesis, I can agree with Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977) that the validity of these subjects' speculations about their own 
behavior would not be any greater than that of subjects speculating about the 
reasons for other people's selection behavior. 
Our model of verbal report also provides considerable guidance for how 
verbal reports should be encoded and what inferences can legitimately be made . 
During the era of introspection, experienced and respected observers made ob-
servations on their own thought processes. These observations were assumed to 
represent facts-a subject reporting X would imply that X was true. Within our 
framework, we would argue that the fact is that the subject reports X. The rather 
uncontroversial inference we want to make is that the subject attends to X. 
Let us clarify this by returning to the protocol on mental multiplication. A 
traditional psychologist might only accept the validity of the verbalization of the 
final answer. From the verbalization of the fina l answer we infer that the final 
answer was generated and heeded. In an analogous way we infer from the 
sequence of verbalized intermediate products a corresponding sequence of 
heeded information . The verbally reported thoughts are data, and a model is 
needed to account for how relevant thoughts are generated-hence a fu ll model 
would regenerate the heeded information. In many cases, one will find that a 
simulation model able to regenerate the verbally reported intermediate steps will 
be powerful enough to generate the final solutions to the presented problems. 
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It may appear that I am unduly cautious in accepting inferences drawn from 
verbal reports. However, much of the poor reputation of verbal reports comes 
from the debatable validity of psychodynamic analysis of dreams and fantasy. 
Furthermore, all too often general statements like, " I always do X," are in-
terpreted to be unconditionally true , and when inconsistent performance data are 
obtained, the inference is made that all verbally reported information is question-
able. Herbert Simon and I interpret such verbalizations to simply indicate that the 
subject at that time believes (correctly or incorrectly) that he always does X. 
Traditionally, subjects have been interviewed at the end of experiments and 
test-taking sessions about their strategies and thought processes during the ex-
periment. At the end of the experiment subjects have poor memory for their 
actual sequences of thoughts leading to specific solutions. Furthermore, investi-
gators often encourage subjects to describe a general strategy that encourages 
them to make inferences and speculate rather than attempt to recall specific 
memories for actual solutions. It is not surprising that strategies assessed through 
such postexperimental probing provide a poor fit to the subjects' performance 
during all phases of the experiment. 
For most tasks it is easy to determine what constitutes a thought. In Table 6.3 
I have reproduced a protocol from a subject solving an anagram problem, where 
TABLE 6.3 
A Transc ript of a Thinking - Aloud Protocol From a 
Subject So lving the Anagram 'NPEHPA' Reco rded by Sargent (1940) 
N-P , neph, neph 
Probably PH goes togethe r 
Phan 
Phanny 
I get phen-ep 
no. Nap-
Phep-an, no 
E is at the end 
Phap-en 
People , I think of 
Try PH after the other letters 
Naph, no 
I thought of paper again 







C:E (end ) 
A:phap-en 
A:people 
C:PH (e nd) 
A:naph 
A:paper 
couldn I t go together without a consonan·t 
Try double P C:PP 
happy A:happy 
Happen A:happen 
*On the right side encodings of the verbalized thoughts are 
given. Adapted by Ericsson and Simon (1985). 
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the object is to rearrange the letters to form a single English word . On the right-
hand side of Table 6.3 I have given corresponding encodings of the verbalized 
thoughts. There are two types of task-relevant thoughts . First, the subject selects 
likely letter combinations and decides where in the solution word they are likely 
to occur. I denote these constraints or cues as C### (position). Second, the 
subject generates alternative possible solution words (denoted by A:###). 
These encodings can then be used as data for further model-building and hypoth-
esis-testing. 
By necessity , this description of the model for verbal report generation and 
protocol analysis, developed by Simon and myself, is brief. The interested reader 
should consult the more extensive discussion of these issues in our recent book 
(Ericsson & Simon, 1984) . In spite of its brevity, I hope I have conveyed to you 
that protocol analysis stands on sound methodological ground and that findings 
from analyses of verbal protocols can be accepted as facts in our attempts to 
understand the human mind . 
IMPLICATIONS OF VERBAL REPORTS FOR 
MEASUREMENT AND THEORETICAL ABSTRACTIONS 
Verbal reports on cognitive processes provide a much more detailed description 
of the cognitive processes in a task than the traditional forms of data, i.e., 
response accuracy and latency. The stuation is structurally similar to the dif-
ferences between observations made by the naked eye and the same observations 
made with a microscope or a telescope . Objects appearing to be similar or even 
identical to the naked eye are demonstrated to either remain identical or to appear 
very different with the availability of more information about their detailed 
structure and components. There are two rather different approaches to system-
atizing the newly acquired , detailed information. The first method is to focus on 
objects assumed to be similar or identical, and examine their detailed properties 
to validate or refute the assumption of similarity. This method examines the-
oretical assumptions in essentially a hypothes is-testing mode. The other method 
is primarily inductive and considers the detailed information directly . From the 
detailed information , critical entities are identified and attempts to form mean-
ingful abstractions are made. In this section , I examine how these two methods 
can be and have been used to relate verbal reports on cognitive processes to 
compound measures, such as reaction time and response accuracy. I start by 
examining some theoretical assumptions about the similarity of cognitive pro-
cesses elicited by a given task or collection of test items. 
Traditionally , investigators select test items such that some or all elicit the 
same process or sequence of processes for all tested subjects. This selection is 
based on intuition or some considerations based on informal or forma l theories. 
In Fig. 6 .2 I have illustrated the data recorded for three individuals on two test 
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Verbal Reports 
Test Item 1 Of Thoughts 
Individual I 
RT"I 







RT3,I .1 C,D,E 
Response 
Test Item II 
Individual I 
RTt,n 
II I F,G 
Response 








FIG. 6.2. Traditional data (latency and response) and verbal report data from 
three subjects' so lutions to two test-items. 
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items. For each subject and test item, both the correctness of the response and the 
reaction time to respond are recorded. 
If the theory used for item selection is correct, then we would be entitled to 
aggregate the data over test items to attain a more accurate measure of accuracy 
and latency for the measured process. There are only limited techniques for 
testing the assumption that all test-items evoke the same process or sequence of 
processes. Only the lack of positive correlation between different subjects' per-
formance on two items would provide evidence against the assumption . Even 
small positive correlations would be consistent with the theoretical claim. 
The situation is quite different when verbal reports on the cognitive processes 
are available. According to our earlier-presented model, I assume that for every 
heeded thought there is a process responsible for its generation. Hence, when I 
talk about a sequence of heeded thoughts, the corresponding sequence of pro-
cesses is implicit. In the lefthand panel of Fig. 6.2 I have abstractly represented 
sequences of verbally reported thoughts for each test item. For solutions to the 
same test item one can compare the sequence of heeded thoughts directly. Such a 
comparison for the two test items indicates that two of the subjects relied on the 
same sequence of thoughts, whereas the third subject relied on a different se-
quence. The fact that all the subjects' thought sequences differ across test items 
is to be expected as the content of the two test items are different. 
By introducing the theoretical idea of processes one can argue that a different 
sequence of thoughts are the reflection of the same sequence of processes. It is 
necessary that the processes are explicitly defined prior to the empirical analysis . 




U "A" U "B" U Response 
I-'nf-'nf-'n I ,,,""-, I ~ Lf ~
!IF" "Gil Response 
FIG. 6.3. Illustration of how two different sequences of verbally reported 
thoughts can be described as the realization of the same sequence of processes. 
the relation between generated thoughts and different content in test items (in-
put). Through the assumption of processes, I can now argue that the aggregation 
of test items provides a legitimate estimate of the speed of the component 
processes. However, for only two of the subjects the same sequence of processes 
are measured . It is important to note that processes are theoretical entities, which 
mayor may not correspond to some unitary psychological process. 
Out of the large number of possible relations between sequences of reported 
thoughts to two test items, we can identify two cases where one can legitimately 
argue that the protocol information is consistent with the claim that the same 
process or sequence of processes is measured by the two items. 
The first case is the extreme case, where no mediating thoughts are verbalized 
for either of the two test items. Such a lack of mediating thoughts would be 
expected for highly automatic reactions, like naming familiar objects , reading, 
etc. It is commonly assumed that rapid reactions (faster than 2 seconds) assure no 
mediating states. However, I later present evidence showing that such a view is 
not correct. 
The second case is the most interesting, where the sequences of reported 
thoughts for the two test items can be seen as the realization of the same sequence 
of processes. For example, a subject performing a mental addition of two 2-digit 
numbers can follow the same process sequence even though the specific numbers 
are different for the two test items. By assuming the existence of a general 
addition process for any two digits , one can see those two different mental 
additions as two realizations of the same general process sequence . Even in this 
uncontroversial example one can question the theoretical status of the general 
addition process. There is evidence showing that the simple addition of two 
digits takes different amounts of time depending on the digits involved (Miller, 
Perlmutter, & Keating, 1984). For adult subjects the differences are small 
enough to make the abstraction of general adding processes completely 
acceptable. 
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It is unlikely to find classes of test items for which the second case is abso-
lutely true. It is reasonably likely that situations will be found where equivalence 
of the cognitive pr'ocesses on the different test items is a good approximation. 
Through the collection of verbal reports on the cognitive processes on test items, 
it si possible to identify blatant violations of the assumptions of measurements of 
the same general process sequence, by identifying systematically different strat-
egies among the tested subjects. Before I turn to a discussion of how different 
investigators have analyzed verbal protocols to abstract general processes, we 
briefly consider an example of analysis of verbal reports for a task with fast 
latencies (less than 2 seconds). 
Ericsson and Simon (1984) reviewed the relatively extensive evidence show-
ing that subjects' retrospective verbal reports provide reliable information to 
predict the latencies for a variety of task domains. The validity of retrospective 
verbal reports extended to tasks with average latencies of less than 2 seconds. 
Systematic attempts to derive a processing model to predict the observed reaction 
times on the basis of retrospective reports are much more rare . Two English 
investigators, Hamilton and Sanford (1978), studied subjects who made simple 
judgments of whether two presented letters, like "RP" or " MO," were in 
alphabetical order or not. In accord with previous investigators , they found that 
the reaction times were longer when the two presented letters occurred close 
together in the alphabet as opposed to when they were far apart. From the 
reaction-time data alone, one would infer a uniform retrieval process, where 
factors internal to the retrieval process required more time for order decisions for 
letters occurring close together in the alphabet. Retrospective verbal reports for 
subjects doing individual decisions indicated two types of cognitive processes. 
For some of the trials , subjects reported no mediation or direct access of their 
order judgment. For the other trials, subjects reported they ran through brief 
segments of the alphabet before making a decision of order. For example, when 
the letter-pair "MO" was presented, a subject reported retrieving "LMNO" 
before the subject reached the decision that the letters were in alphabetical order. 
In another case a subject reported retrieving "RSTUV" before rejecting the 
letter-pair "RP" as not being in alphabetical order. In a subsequent analysis of 
the reaction times , Hamilton and Sanford (1978) found very different relations 
with the separation of the two letters for trials with direct access, versus trials 
with retrieval of segments of the alphabet. For trials with retrieval, the observed 
reaction time was a linear function of the number of retrieved letters. The 
estimated rate of retrieval corresponded closely to rates obtained in studying 
simple recital of the alphabet. For trials with reports of direct access, no relation 
of reaction time to the amount of separation of the two letters was found . 
Hamilton and Sanford (1978) concluded that the original effect was due to a 
mixture of two quite different processes, and that closeness of the letters influ-
enced the probability that recall of letters would be necessary before an order 
decision could be made. 
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Hence, even in simple tasks with rapid responses , one can see variability in 
cognitive processes or reported thought sequences leading to differences in ob-
served reaction times. As the complexity of the task increases, the range of 
possible thought sequences giving the correct response increases dramatically. 
With practice on a task , the availability of short-cuts and emergence of different 
and more efficient representations and corresponding strategies makes the space 
of possible thought sequences mediating correct solutions intimidatingly large. 
In a later section I more directly address the issues of assessing the avai lability of 
strategies and representations for subjects. The conclusion I draw at this point is 
that protocol analysis provides a sensitive measure to help us define equivalent 
classes of processes for which proper measurement of the speed of component 
processes is valid. Consistent individual differences in mean reaction time cannot 
and should not be interpreted as evidence for stable characteristics of basic 
processes. For many types of test items , considerable diversity in frequency of 
use of short-cuts and strategies is possible. 
On the detailed level of description provided by verbal reports, the variability 
between individuals appears so large that any attempt to search for general 
theories of cognitive activities might appear futile. 
Before turning to the fina l section with applications of protocol analysis to 
tests and measurements, I briefly review research from three areas of general 
psychology where protocol analysis has been related to such general models . The 
three areas are problem solving, decision making, and memory. In each of these 
areas , I show how detailed descriptions of processes can be reconciled with 
abstract and general, sometimes mathematical, descriptions of processes. 
It is appropriate to start with a discussion of problem solving, because it was 
the analyses of problem solving by Newell and Simon (1972) that led them to 
produce the first computer simulations of cognitive processes. In their pioneering 
work of subjects proving theorems in propositional logic they collected thinking-
aloud protocols from subjects solving such tasks. The verbalized thoughts were 
identified as being results of induced general information processes, which could 
be explicated as routines in a computer program. Newell and Simon (1972) also 
induced a general organization of problem solving, which they called means-
ends analysis. They found that a simulation model of human problem solving 
was sufficiently powerful to produce the solution, and at the same time the 
mediating steps of the program corresponded closely to the verbally reported 
thoughts of subjects. The correspondence of subjects' verbal reports and the 
theory or simulation model was on the level of types of intermediate steps rather 
than exact order of intermediate steps leading to the solution. 
Subsequent evidence for means-ends analysis has been demonstrated for a 
wide range of problems (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). For example, I can illustrate 
the similarity of verbalized thought across different subjects for the 8-puzzle. In 
the 8-puzzle, subjects are presented with a 3x3 matrix of numbered tiles as 
shown in Fig. 6.4. By sliding one of the directly adjacent tiles into the empty 
FI G. 6.4. Example of a configura-
tion for the 8-puzzle (left); thi s is to 
be transformed into a goal configura-
tion (right) . 
6. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 205 
START 






space, the arrangement of tiles can be changed. Subjects are instructed to move 
tiles until they attain the goal configuration given on the right in Fig. 6.4. 
According to means-ends analysis, subjects should solve this problem by 
finding differences between the goal configuration and the current arrangement 
of tiles. From an analysis of the task it is poss ible to a priori predict the space of 
possible thoughts (problem space) that subjects will generate in response to a 
problem like the 8-puzzle. The first difference they encounter is that the tile with 
number I is not in its correct location. In Table 6.4 I have illustrated a small 
sample of the times subjects verbalized their intention to put T ile 1 in its correct 
place. 
The verbalizations in Table 6.4 differ in exact wording but the thought is the 
same. Once they placed Ti le I they would proceed to place Ti le 2, etc. A more 
complete account of subjects' problem solving in the 8-puzzle is given by 
Ericsson (1 975) . 
Means-ends analysis appears to provide a general account of subjects' behav-
ior on problems with which they are naive or unfamiliar. With expertise and 
considerable experience, the structure of the problem solving is quite different 
and becomes a function of the subject's extensive knowledge of the task domain 
(Chi , Feltov ich, & Glaser, 198 1; Larkin , McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980). 
TABLE 6 .4 
Examples of Ve r ba l izat ions to Atta in Cor rect Pl acement of Til e I 
I 'm going to try to get 1 
I must get 1 up there 
I sha l l try to get 1 here 
first get 1 t here instead of 4 
I shall have 1 u p 
I want to have the 1 up there 
t h inking of moving 
t hat I shall 
in any case 
now I want to 
try to get them in order 
to start with 
move 1 up where it should be 
1 u p at once 
get 1 here 
to get 1 up (and get 2 t here , first 1 up ) 
get 1 in place first and foremost 
have 1 up righ t from the beginning 
1 upmost to t h e left a nd get it in 
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The demonstration of general problem-solving methods has received consid-
erable attention from educators, who have explored the possibility of teaching 
students such methods . In the final section I discuss this attempt to describe 
individual differences among subjects in terms of the availability of such general 
methods to subjects. Training subjects to use means-ends analysis appears to be 
somewhat misguided, as virtually all subjects exhibit such a method spon-
taneously in unfamiliar tasks . 
Another domain with consistent patterns of cognitive processes is decision 
making. In the paradigmatic decision-making situation, a subject is presented 
with a set of alternatives. Each alternative is characterized by different attributes 
on several common dimensions. The prevailing model of how decisions are 
made is that all attributes are combined using a mathematical weighting function 
to form a single evaluation score. Deciding which is the "best" alternative in the 
set would then correspond to selecting the one with the highest evaluation score. 
Few, if any, investigators have argued that such a mathematical formula mirrors 
the cognitive processes of human subjects making decisions. 
Verbal protocols of subjects making decisions have shown cognitive pro-
cesses quite different from a sequential full evaluation of each alternative (Payne, 
1976; Svenson, 1979). Instead, subjects begin by rejecting alternatives because 
they have unacceptab le values on important dimensions. When only a couple of 
viable alternatives remain, subjects switch to a more intensive analysis, where 
differences on some dimensions are traded off or compared to differences on 
other dimensions . Other data, recording what information subjects attend to , 
have provided converging support for the existence of these different processes. 
Analogous to the previously discussed work on problem solving, general pro-
cesses sufficiently powerful to account for the observed behavior have been 
identified . 
Research on how subjects evaluate alternatives (judgment) has found that 
verbally reported categorical decisions can describe a series of judgments equally 
as well as an empirically fitted linear regression model (Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & 
Kleinmuntz, 1979) . In one of their experiments, Einhorn et al. (1979) observed a 
subject thinking aloud while judging many cereals on a five-category scale. From 
the thinking-aloud protocols they identified a number of rules used by the sub-
ject. These rules predicted the subject's categorizations of a new set of cereals 
remarkably well , in fact as well as a regression model identified for the first set 
of judgments . Einhorn et al. (1979) established the correspondence between 
these different types of models by showing how a linear regression model can 
closely approximate categorical rules as reflected in a verbal report. This last 
result is particularly important as it demonstrates that prevailing mathematical 
models can be reconciled with the more detailed evidence from verbal protocols . 
The research in both problem solving and decision making has shown the 
types of cognitive processes revealed through protocol analysis provide a suffi-
cient and general account of subjects' performance . The consistency across 
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subjects is intriguing, and many investigators have argued that general informa-
tion processing constraints lead subjects toward adopting such processes and 
strategies. At least, these analyses show that the adopted processes are compati-
ble with the well-known limits of attention and short-term memory. 
Studies of memory and retention have always been one of the central areas in 
general psychology. Ever since Ebbinghaus (1964, 1885) invented the nonsense 
syllable, there has been explicit concern to study pure memory, that is, memory 
and retention uncontaminated by previous knowledge. During the behaviorist 
era, few investigators challenged the assumption that no intermediate processes 
were involved during memorization . In the 50s, it was demonstrated that non-
sense syllables were differentially difficult to memorize and that this difficulty 
could be independently predicted from the meaningfulness of the nonsense sylla-
ble (Noble, 1952). In the 60s and early 70s , investigators asked subjects to 
verbally report their thoughts during study. These investigators found a remark-
able diversity of different mediating thoughts reported by different subjects. I 
have extracted some examples of mediating thoughts in Table 6.5 from studies of 
Martin, Boersma, and Cox (1965), and Prytulak (1971). 
The central issue concerned whether different reported mediators during study 
of items were related to subsequent recall performance on the corresponding 
items. Several different encoding schemes were developed to use explicit criteria 
for the goodness of the generated mediating responses, like those in Table 6.5. 
Although the biggest difference appeared between some mediating response 
versus no mediating response (rote rehearsal) these encoding schemes were also 
able to capture differences between types of mediating responses. This extensive 
research is fully reviewed by Montague (1972). Subsequent research in which 
subjects formed meaningful associations via visual images or constructing sen-
tences have demonstrated very large effects compared to uninstructed subjects' 
TABLE 6.5 
Exampl es of Mediating Thoughts in Memorizing Indi vidua l 







Sagroie - Polef 







Each word contains an OLE. 
Sagrole begins with Sand Polef 
with F, thought of State Police 
Changed Rennet to Bennet and saw 
Quips in Quipson--thought; Bennet 
Cerf Quips on TV 
~From Prytu1ak, 1971. 
From Mar t i n, Boersma, and Cox, 1965. 
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performance (Bellezza, 1981; Bower, 1972). From an individual difference per-
spective, it is interesting that some subjects report using such effective means for 
memorization without instruction (Bower, 1972). 
Detailed descriptions of the associations making up the memory trace are by 
no means inconsistent with current mathematical theories of memory. These 
theories represent memory traces as associations of different strengths. Verbal 
reports allow us to assess the micro-structure of these associative bonds. 
Summary 
Verbal reports on cognitive processes in a task provide a series of intermediate 
steps (heeded thoughts), which are generated by corresponding cognitive pro-
cesses. Hence, verbal report data can be used to confirm that subjects' responses 
to test items are generated by the same sequence of component processes. In the 
case that verbal reports show different sequences of processes for a set of test 
items as evidenced by short-cuts or different strategies, average reaction times 
and accuracies for items in a test will not measure differences in stable charac-
teristics of assumed underlying processes, and thus these average results of the 
test reflect a composite of factors and cannot be interpreted as a pure measure of 
anything. 
For the domains of problem solving, decision making, and memory, system-
atic analysis of verbal reports allows for the abstraction of postulated cognitive 
processes. These cognitive processes, like forming meaningful associations or 
interactive visual images (memory), or means-ends analysis (problem solving), 
were generally found for all individuals in the corresponding task domain and 
appeared to account for previous findings based on traditional performance data. 
These and other demonstrations (Ericsson & Simon, 1984) that generalizable 
aspects of cognitive processes can be induced from analyses of verbal reports 
give considerable confidence that similar analyses of cognitive processes elicited 
by tests will be successful. 
Protocol Analysis in Assessment and Measurement 
The purpose of this final section is to select a small number of important mea-
surement issues and illustrate how protocol analysis has been applied to further 
our understanding. The first issue concerns how one can identify actual and valid 
cognitive processes. The fact that it is possible to verbally describe a hypothetical 
cognitive process does not assure its empirical validity. After a brief historical 
review of earlier attempts to identify processes and representations of general 
applicability, I concentrate on more recent efforts to specify such general pro-
cesses in the analysis of mathematical ability. 
The second issue regards the importance of differences in strategies for per-
formance on psychometric tests . I focus on some recent research on tests measur-
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ing spatial ability . In the introduction I mentioned that one of the few individual 
differences consistently explained by differences in bas ic processes concerns 
exceptional abilities, especially exceptional memory (Wechsler , 1952). Drawing 
on my collaborative research with Bill Chase, I will examine whether such 
memory processes are basic and direct, as evidenced by a lack of mediating 
states in the verbal reports. 
Use of Verba l Reports to Assess Individual Differences 
Some of the earliest studies using verbal reports identified general differences 
between subjects' reported cognitive processes and representations. The impor-
tance of differences in cognitive processes was shown by Heidbreder (1 924) , 
who found consistent differences in concept formation between subjects actively 
generating and testing hypotheses and subjects more passively waiting until 
hypotheses occurred to them. The importance of differences in representation 
were demonstrated by several independent studies of human maze learning, 
which found striking differences in learning rate as a function of the mode of 
encoding (motor , spatial , or verbal) reported by subjects when they had to 
memori ze solution paths. (For a review see Ericsson & Simon , 1984 .) 
Since the publication of Bloom and Broder's influential study of problem 
solving in 1950 , research on individual differences using the verbal report meth-
odology primari ly has focused on identifying general and task-independent pro-
cesses and strategies . Although the results of thi s research on general processes 
have been rather di sappointing, it is worthwhile to describe some of these studies 
and discuss reasons for the lack of success of such approaches. Later I discuss 
other research focusing on more task-specific processes and knowledge . 
Bloom and Broder ( 1950) were interested in processes of thought and reason-
ing rather than simple fact retrieval, as emphasized in many educational tests. By 
selecting test items requiring reasoning, they found intriguing differences be-
tween think-aloud protocols of subjects with high and low aptitUde scores. Low 
aptitude subjects tended not to be able to represent the problem in such a way that 
their relevant knowledge could be retrieved or used for in ferences in generating 
solutions. The weakness of low aptitude subjects was taken as a focus for a 
remedial program for training low aptitude subjects. The training program was 
successful , and Bloom and Broder (1 950) attribute its success to training in 
general cognitive processes. However, the lack of methodological controls in 
their study makes their results only suggestive. 
In the domain of mathematics, similar ideas have been explored with explicit 
concern for methodological issues. Many have the belief that mathematical abil -
ity is something more general than a composite of specific abilities to solve types 
of mathematical problems. Polya (1 957) is one of the few theori sts who has 
explicitly proposed general methods (heuristic questions) in mathematical prob-
lem solving. Examples of such heuri stic questions are' 'What is the unknown ?" , 
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"Will a figure help?", "Have I solved a related problem before?" , "Can I see 
that it is correct?" (Polya, 1957). 
In his pioneering dissertation, Kilpatrick (1968) took these questions and 
attempted to describe cognitive acitivity that would provide evidence for the 
existence of such general problem-solving heuristics. After considerable explora-
tory work, he identified a revised set of heuristics relevant to the mathematical 
problems solved by 8th-grade subjects. From the thinking-aloud protocol of each 
subject, Kilpatrick (1968) would determine if evidence for the application of any 
one of the heuristics was available. 
Kilpatrick's attempt to predict mathematical problem-solving performance 
(time , percent age correct) from the frequency with which heuristics were used 
failed. Ericsson and Simon (1984) have summarized similar negative results of 
several other studies using encoding schemes based on Polya's work (1957). 
In examining the failure to identify heuristics , it is important to realize that the 
hypothesized processes were not induced or abstracted from the protocols, but 
derived theoretically. Even more important is the fact that these heuristics were 
not (and possibly could never be) explicated in such detail that one would know 
when and exactly how to apply them. It is implicitly assumed in Kilpatrick's 
(1968) aggregation procedure that application of anyone of the heuristics will 
always be helpful in solving any problem. A subsequent study Gimmestad 
(1977) showed that application of various heuristics was differentially useful for 
FREQUENCY (F,) OF PROBLEM SO LUTION S WITH EVIDENCE FOR 
HEURISTIC ABC D 
EVIDENCE 






F, F2 F3 F 4 . 
/~ 
YE S No 
NO YES 
NO NO 
YE S YES 
THINK -ALOUD THINK - ALOUD 
PROTOCOL I PROTOCOL 2 
FIG. 6.5. The aggregation of information about judged use of specified 
heuristics for a given subject. Each thinking-aloud protocol is first scored with a 
dichotomous decision regarding use of a given heuristic. An aggregate measure is 
obtained for each subject by counting the number of problems where a gi ven 
heuristic was used. 
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solving different problems. In fact, application of some heuristics was found to 
be negatively related with success on some problems. 
The best ev idence against the implicit generality of these heuristics comes 
from studies of training subjects in applying these heuristics . There appears to be 
little or no transfer of heuristics to problems different from practice problems 
(Lucas, 1972). However, some transfer in use of heuristics has been observed for 
problems similar (but not identical) to the problems used in training (Schoenfeld, 
1979). It appears safe to conclude that application of general heuristics requires 
knowledge of when and how to apply them. This knowledge is necessarily 
relatively specific to types of problems. 
Studies assessing the use of heuristics have provided important additional data 
on factors determining performance on mathematics tests. Webb (1975) found 
that basic tests of mathematical achievement accounted for 40% of the variance 
on mathematics tests , which was considerably more than any predictor related to 
the use of heuristics . 
In their classic work on problem solving, Newell and Simon (1972) argued for 
the importance of knowledge on effective problem solving, and for the specifici-
ty of problem-solving methods. Lesgold (1984) reviewed evidence from a wide 
range of domains and demonstrates the importance of specific knowledge in the 
acquisition of skill for each domain. 
In parallel with the studies relying on Polya's heuristics , other researchers 
have studied mathematical problem solving with much more emphasis on knowl-
edge and domain-specific methods. Hins ley, Hayes, and Simon (1977), for 
example, showed that subjects would reliably sort algebra word problems in 
categories or problem types (e.g., mixture problems, distancelrate/time prob-
lems). From an analysis of thinking-aloud protocols they found that subjects 
appeared to categorize a given problem early during the solution of that problem 
and use knowledge about that type of problem to aid in the solution process. 
Subjects' ability to sort mathematical problems into types with the same mathe-
matical structure was shown by Silver (1979) to be predictive of subjects' perfor-
mance on a related mathematics test, even after IQ scores and scores on tests of 
mathematical concepts and computation were controlled for. Similarly Kennedy, 
Eliot, and Kru lee (1970) analyzed students' thinking-aloud protocols while solv-
ing algebra problems in content-defined steps, which were determined separately 
for each problem. Their major result was that students of lower ability were less 
able to generate the necessary physical inferences from the information in the 
problem statement, rather than having any basic deficits in knowledge about 
algebra and mathematics . 
The most successful attempts to identify individual differences come from 
rather complete analyses of very simple and specific tasks. Children in school are 
taught explicit procedures to solve different types of problems in arithmetic. By 
matching the target procedure against the observed sequence of processing steps 
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it has been possible to identify school chi ldrens' systematic errors and miscon-
ceptions. In some early work , Buswell and John (1928) identified around 150 
types of errors from students solving arithmetic problems aloud . 
The importance of verbal reports for assessing many types of errors becomes 
clear from the three types of errors in division shown in Table 6.6 . 
In more recent work, several investigators (Brown & Burton , 1978; Brown & 
VanLehn, 1980; Young & O'Shea, 1981) have developed simulation models that 
can account for and describe errors in the subdomain of subtraction problems, 
with reference to general rules for carrying out the subtraction procedure. These 
attempts do not rely on verbal reports , but induce the type of error from con-
sistent patterns of incorrect results on several problems. This means that diag-
nosis of errors can be conducted automatically through a computer program, 
which also can serve as a tutor by explaining to the student the nature of his or 
her specific types of errors. 
This brief review of studies on individual differences in mathematical abi lity 
shows essentially no evidence for the mediation of very generalizable cognitive 
processes . The protocol data suggest the importance of cognitive processes relat-
ed to problem types as well as specific procedures and knowledge. However, 
protocol analysis can only provide a partial answer to the question of how general 
or specific the cognitive processes are that generated the thoughts given in the 
verbal reports. It can provide a lower bound for the generality, in that when 
subjects verbalize recognition of specific types of problems, like' 'distance-time-
rate" problems in mathematics or "conservation of energy" problems in me-
chanics, the inferred processes need to be equally general. The inferences about 
the generality of processes generating intermediate steps/thoughts is an empirical 
issue that can only be clarified by observing subjects' so lutions to a specified 
TABLE 6.6 
Three Examples of Ve rba l Report s From St ude nt s Thinking Aloud Whil e 
Div iding two Numbers (Shown to the Le ft) 






Another pupil said, " 16 into 57 goes 3 times [mul tiplied 
and subtracted]; 16 into 9 won't go [wrote 0 in the quotie nt]; 
16 into 96 goes 6 times. " 
Added Remainder to Quotient 
442 
2 964 
The pupil sa id, " 2 into 9 is 4 times a nd lover; 2 into 6 , 
3 times and 1 i s 4; 2 into 4 , 2 times." 
Began Dividing at Units' Digit of Divide nd 
26 
7 31 542 
One boy said , "7 into 42, 6; 7 into 1 5 , 2 a nd lover. " 
He was puzzled because 7 would not go into 3 a nd 26 
did not l ook right but could think of n o other method. 
Each verbal report illustrat es a common type of error. 
From Bus"ell a nd John, 1928, pp. 184, 186. 
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class of problems and tasks. It is clear that verbal reports will be indispensable 
data in these empirical tests of generality. 
Assessing Strateg ies in Tests of Spatial Ability 
In a recent article in Psychological Review, Just and Carpenter (1985) present a 
very interesting analysis of cognitive processes involved in the performance 
measured by a psychometric test of spatial ability. Examples of a couple of test 
items from a cube comparison test are illustrated in Fig. 6.6. 
The task is to decide if the two drawings could or could not be views of the 
same cube. The general psychological process generally assumed to account for 
subjects' abi lity to make correct judgments is called mental rotation . Just and 
Carpenter (1985) went further, defining several types of possible strategies for 
solving this task and developing complete simulation models in the form of 
computer programs. For my intended discussion of the verbal reports on cog-
nitive processes in this task , a brief description of three of these strategies is 
sufficient. 
The first strategy corresponds to mental rotation of the cube along the stan-
dard ax is of the cube. In order to rotate the cube at the left to overlap with the 
corresponding cube on the right , one might first rotate the E towards the top and 
then turn the cube so the E will match in orientation (see Fig. 6.7-1). A second, 
and in many cases more efficient, strategy would be to select a nonstandard 
rotation axis as illustrated in Fig. 6 .7-11. With such a selection of a rotation axis a 
single rotation is sufficient. 
With the third strategy, orientation-free descriptions, subjects encode the 
information for the presented cube on the left as two symbolic descriptions where 
~ E IA 618 
@ @ 
FIG. 6.6. Examples of three possi- @ @ ble test-items from the cube com-
parison test. 
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Example of verbal report: 
"If you first rotale the E on the fronl 10 th e top and 
then turn the cube so that the E will match (in orientation}.!! 
II A single rotation along 000- standard axis 
EKample of verbal reporl: 
II I spun it around the co rn er of the three sides until 
Ih e letters mol c hed up ." 
m Orienlatian -free deSCriptions 
Encode Match 
~ 
A The bottom of the H is directly ~ 
/' above the lop of Ihe E "'-... 
E ~ ~ The right of the E is direct ly to ,,/' ,J: ~ 
Ihe lefl of Ihe right of Ih e four 
FIG. 6.7. An illustration of three different strategies for solving items in the cube 
comparison test. 
one of them could be "the bottom of the H is above the top of the E." This 
encoded information of one of the cubes can be validated or invalidated by 
comparing it to information provided in the second cube. [n comparing the 
retrospective reports of subjects with high scores on spatial tests to subjects with 
low scores, Just and Carpenter (1985) found reliable differences in reported 
cognitive processes. Three of the high-ability subjects used predominantly non-
standard rotation axes when applicable, whereas low-abi lity subjects used stan-
dard axes. One of the high-ability subjects relied on orientation-free descriptions. 
From analyses of the temporal sequence of eye-fixations, Just and Carpenter 
(1985) could validate the verbally reported cognitive processes as responsible for 
the different pattern of latencies for high- and low-ability subjects. In addition, 
the high-ability subjects using the orientation-free description displayed a differ-
ent pattern of latencies from subjects using the other two strategies. Just and 
Carpenter (1985) argued for the importance of determining and describing strat-
egies to better understand spatial ability as measured by psychometric tests. They 
also noted that "trivial" changes in aspects of cube comparison tests can change 
the strategies subjects use. Just and Carpenter (1985) collected verbal reports 
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from subjects taking the original Thurstone version of the cube comparison test, 
which differs only in that arrows, circles, and pluses are used instead of letters. 
For that version, subjects predominantly used the strategy of orientation-free 
descriptions rather than the strategies using rotation. 
The role of verbal reports in identifying strategies is even more clear in earlier 
studies of spatial ability . In two earlier studies (Barratt, 1953; French, 1965) 
subjects were asked to think aloud and verbalize their solution processes to 
sample items from many psychometric tests, which they had previously taken 
under standardized conditions. The methods for extracting strategies for solving 
items from specific tests were only briefly described , but given that high inter-
rater agreement of encoding was obtained, the findings should be considered 
seriously . Barratt (1953) showed that assessed solution methods or strategies 
were reliably related to performance on several psychometric tests measuring 
spatial abi lity. In his original dissertation Barratt (1952) provides more detail 
about his methods of assessing subjects' strategies. For example, Barratt (1952) 
identified about half of the subjects as mentally rotating whole figures in the 
Figures Test on the bas is of verbal reports like these: 
Subject # 18: " .. . . I would look at all these various choices here, and I would 
take the problem and try to switch it around , turn it around in the same form as 
these here; after I turn it around , I see that they can be made to coinc ide .... " 
Subject #44: "I'm trying to turn the figure around in a way that it is in the same 
position that the key problem would be .. .. " (pp. 58- 59) 
Most of the other subjects appeared to rotate only parts of the figures as indicated 
by the following verbal reports : 
Subject #4: " ... . The semic ircle is pointed in one direction, and the V is to 
the bottom of it , and if the figure were the same way, we ll , the semicircle would be 
pointed in the same direction , or if it were laying down or opposite , the semicircle , 
uh , the V would always be to the left. ... " 
Subject #79: " .. . . I' d look at this V here; I would look for ones that would 
be this way if turned this way ..... I would look at thi s bar on the bottom; that 
would be my distinguishing mark here; the bar is turned around in B, etc. 
(Barratt , 1952 , p. 59) 
French (1965) divided his subjects into two groups on the basis of their 
strategy for solving items in a given test. For each group the intercorrelations on 
all psychometric tests were recomputed separately. Subsequent factor-analys is of 
each group showed remarkably different factor structures for several of the 
strategies. French (1965) summarized his findings by saying "Systematizing is a 
tendency which leads a person to use specialized or symbolic thought processes; 
this changes what the tests measure , and consequently affects the correlations 
between the tests" (p. 28). 
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The research on performance of tasks measuring spatial abi lity is particularly 
interesting as it illustrates how quite different sources of data (reaction time, eye-
movement data, verbal reports, training studies and experiments) provide con-
verging support for the importance of strategies in accounting for individual 
differences (Lohman & Kyllonen, 1983; Snow & Lohman, 1984). It also nicely 
demonstrates the need for information-rich data, like eye-movements and verbal 
reports, to fu lly describe complex cognitive entities such as strategies. 
EXCEPTIONAL ABILITY vs. ACQUIRED SKILL 
Given the reports on successful elicitation of verbal reports on cognitive pro-
cesses described in the two preceding sections, one might rightfully ask which 
abilities are basic and yield no or unin formative verbal reports. In the introduc-
tion I mentioned that exceptional abilities, like exceptional memory, have con-
sistently been attributed to innate differences in the structure of memory. Implicit 
in the definition of exceptional basic abilities is the claim that normal subjects 
cannot attain such abi lities even after extensive practice . Furthermore, it is 
claimed that demonstration of such abilities in, for example, a memory task, will 
not allow the subject to report any mediating cognitive processes. In the first part 
of this section I describe some research I conducted with the late Bill Chase 
examining practice on a specific task . I then discuss analyses of people with 
alleged exceptional memory. 
Effects of Practice on Performance on Memory Tests 
Bill Chase and I intentionally selected digit span, because several investigators 
had proposed that digit span provided the best measure of the fixed capacity of 
short-term memory (STM). The fast rate of presentation of digits was assumed to 
force subjects to exclusively rely on STM in this memory task . 
Our research approach consisted of providing subjects with extensive practice 
on the digit-span task and monitoring any improvements by requesting retro-
spective verbal reports from a selected portion of the trials. All significant 
changes in the reported thoughts were validated by a specia lly designed experi-
ment (Chase & Ericsson, 1981, 1982; Ericsson, Chase, & Faloon, 1980) . 
The focus of this account is on our first subject (SF) , who discovered the 
means to improve his memory performance. SF was selected to be a representa-
tive and average college student with respect to intelligence and memory abi lity. 
His original digit span was about seven. 
During each session SF was read random digits at the rate of one digit per 
second; he then recalled the sequence. If the sequence was reported correctly, the 
next sequence was increased by one digit; otherwise it was decreased by one 
digit. The performance on the last sequence in the preceding session determined 
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the length of the digit sequence presented on the first trial on the following 
session. Figure 6.8 shows SF's average digit span as a funct ion of practice for 
over 200 practice sessions distributed over 2 years. 
Figure 6.8 shows that SF increased his digit span from 7 to over 80 digits . A 
naive interpretation of this dramatic increase in memory performance is that SF 
simply extended his short-term memory by a factor of 10. In comparison, sub-
jects with alleged exceptional memory have digit spans of less than 20 digits . 
The relation to exceptional memory is discussed later. 
However, after most of the digit-span tests, SF gave a retrospective verbal 
report on his cognitive processes during the trial. From an analysis of these 
verbal reports, we find that SF's memory performance can be accounted for in 
terms of an acqu ired sk ill rather than expansion of some basic capacity . The main 
findings were confirmed by experimental tests. 
During the first session with the digit-span task, the verbal reports show that 
SF relied almost exclusively on rehearsal of all presented digits to remember 
them. In the second session he started trying to commit the first three digits of a 
series to memory and to rehearse the remaining digits of the presented series. 
Once the rehearsed digits had been committed to memory, he would retrieve the 
first three and initiate recall. The primary mode of encoding was repetition of 
digits and different numerical relations. 
During Session 5, SF reported that he suddenly realized that a 3-digit se-
quence could be interpreted as a running time for a mile. For example, 418 could 
be a 4-minute, 18-second mile-time. His average digit span for this session 
jumped four standard deviations from the session before. SF was a long-distance 
runner with extensive knowledge of both specific and general categories of 
FIG . 6.8. Average digit span for SF 











running times for a large number of different races. During the following ses-
sions, SF retrieved a set of races (y4-mile, Y2-mile, V4-mile, mile, 2-mile) that 
would cover the range of most 3-digit numbers from 100 to 959. However, no 3-
digit numbers with a middle digit of 6, 7, 8, or 9, (e.g., 483, 873) can be 
interpreted as meaningful running times . In one experiment we presented digit 
sequences made up of only such uncodable 3-digit sequences to SF and his 
memory-span was reduced almost to the level prior to practice. Later SF started 
to encode 4-digit groups as running times. The different types of encodings are 
illustrated in a typical retrospective report given by SF shown in Table 6.7. 
Finally, SF used an encoding as ages of people for digit groups that could not 
be meaningfully encoded as running times or dates. 
In parallel with the emergence of new and more effective encodings of 3- and 
4-digit groups, SF started to store up to four different groups in memory in 
addition to the four to five digits in the rehearsal buffer. In order to recall these 
digit groups in their correct order, SF encoded the order of presentation of each 
digit group as first, middle, or last. At the time of recall, SF could use this as the 
main cue to retrieve the encoded digit groups in the presented order. The encod-
ing of these additional cues, integrated with memory traces for the purpose of 
subsequent retrieval , we call retrieval-structure. In order to be able to store more 
groups in memory SF introduced a new level of organization, and used two 
super-groups to organize encoded digits as either 4-digit groups or 3-digit 
groups. This hierarchical organization is illustrated in Fig. 6.9, and was evi-
denced in SF's retrospective verbal reports on how he encoded the digit se-
quence, as well as in the pauses and intonation patterns of his recall of the digit 
sequence. Before our experimental study of SF ended, he had extended his 
retrieval structure to successfully hold 84 digits. 
TABLE 6.7 
An Example of SF's Retrospective Reports From a Digit-Span Trial 
Presented sequence: 4 1 3 1 7 7 8 4 0 6 0 3 4 9 4 8 7 0 9 4 6 2 
Segmented digit groups: 4131 - 7784 - 0603 - 494 - 870 - 9462 
Retrospective report: 
Starting from the beginning. 
I made the four thirteen point one a mile time. 
I just remembered the seventy-seven eighty-four. 
Ok? Ok? Right. Seventy-seven eighty-four. 




No. No. Nothing. Just like seventy-seven eighty-four. 
Ok. Then I made the oh six oh three, I made that a mile time. 
Then I remembered the four nine four and the eight seven oh. 
I just had to remember those. 
Then I remembered the nine forty-six point . .• two! 
It's definitely point two, two-mile. 
I said, so I said to myself "What did you run it in?" 
I ran it in nine forty-six point two. Nine forty-six point two. Right. 
The digits, presented orally at 1 second/digit, are shown at the top of the table 
along with SF's segmentation into digit-groups for this trial. Adapted from Chase 
and Ericsson (1981). 




7401 2319 5559 5675 426 457 133 49800 
FIG. 6.9. Proposed hierarchical organization of SF's memory encoding of thirty 
presented digits. The first level contains mnemonic encodings of digit groups and 
the second level consists of super-groups, where the relative location of several 
digit groups are encoded. 
SF did not rely on short-term memory for his recall of the digits. His digit 
span was essentially unaffected by performing other tasks in the interval between 
the presentation and the recall of a digit sequence, even when these interpolated 
tasks required the full capacity of short-term memory. More conclusive evidence 
for storage in long-term memory is obtained from SF's ability to recall about 
90% of 200-300 presented digits after the session. 
Finally, SF's memory skill did not lead only to an ability to remember a larger 
number of digits. In a self-paced situation, SF showed that shorter digit lists (10-
50 digits) could, after practice, be memorized at more than twice the original 
presentation rate. 
In sum, SF's final performance is based on radically different cognitive pro-
cesses and capacities than his initial performance prior to practice. In our study 
of three additional subjects practicing the digit-span task, we found evidence for 
the same components of skill. Two subjects given fewer practice sessions sur-
passed the magical limit of 20 digits. The third subject attained a digit span of 
more than 100 digits and is still improving with further practice. The fact that our 
subjects could attain digit spans surpassing subjects with alleged exceptional 
memory after only 50-100 hours of practice raises the possibility that the excep-
tional subjects were simply misdiagnosed. 
Alleged Exceptional Memory Ability 
When people attribute to exceptional subjects an innate ability, there is little or 
no evidence to substantiate such an inference. In fact, such attribution is based on 
the lack of alternative explanations (Ericsson & Faivre, in press). Some of the 
affirmative evidence comes from the subject's own verbal descriptions. The 
famous subject S of Luria (1968) reported storing visual images of matrices 
without any mediational activity involving meaning. The exceptional memory of 
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lnaudi was alleged to be based on sound (Binet, 1894) . More commonly subjects 
report a complete lack of mediation, which is often interpreted as evidence for 
innate basic ability . These general verbal descriptions are quite different from the 
thinking-aloud protocols and retrospective reports I advocated earlier. Further, 
there appears to be a conflict of interest that might bias and contaminate the 
verbal reports from exceptional subjects. In our culture a mysterious ability is 
deemed more interesting than one that is understood (cf. an act by a magician 
before and after the detailed steps of the act are explained). If one's livelihood 
depends on the income from public performances of one's ability, which is the 
case with several people of alleged exceptional memory, one ' s willingness to 
describe any available details of the cognitive processes might be reduced. 
First, I report on some comparisons between the memory performance of our 
trained subjects, whose memory structure is known, and the performance of 
subjects with alleged exceptional ability. I then describe some analyses of other 
memory experts using protocol analysis. 
Binet (1894) analyzed the digit memory of two mental calculators and a 
mnemonist. The emphasis on memory for digits was fortunate for Chase and me 
because it provided an interesting test for our trained subjects (SF and DD). One 
of the tasks Binet used was memorization of a 25-digit matrix . Luria (1968) 
reported on memorization of a 50-digit matrix by his subject, S. Ericsson and 
Chase (1982) compared the trained and the exceptional subjects on time taken to 
memorize each of these two matrices, and found that the trained subjects could 
memorize the digits as fast or faster than the exceptional subjects . After the digit 
matrices were committed to memory, the subjects were asked to recall the digits 
from the matrix in a wide range of different orders (backward and forward recall 
of rows, recall of columns of digits starting at the bottom, etc.). It had been 
argued by Binet (1894) that the observed recall times could differentiate between 
auditory and visual memory representations. A reanalysis of these recall times 
showed a remarkable similarity between all exceptional subjects and our two 
trained subjects. In fact, relying on the retrospective verbal reports of one of our 
trained subjects, Chase and I constructed a mathematical model of the retrieval, 
which described the retrieval times of all subjects (exceptional or trained) with 
remarkable accuracy (Ericsson & Chase, 1982) . 
When Luria (1968) argued that his subject, S, had an exceptional memory, it 
was based on a combination of performance data and verbal descriptions from S 
on how he memorized information. A review of a surprisingly large number of 
case studies of memory experts shows that the subjects showing the most excep-
tional memory performance do not claim to have structurally different memories 
(Ericsson , 1985) . Extensive laboratory studies of Professor Rueckle (Mueller, 
1911, 1913, 1917) and of a professional mnemonist, lsahara, (Susukita, 1933 , 
1934) provide detailed accounts of their methods for memorization directly con-
sistent with the three attributes of acquired memory skill discussed earlier (Chase 
& Ericsson, 1982). For example, a contemporary analysis of a waiter with 
exceptional memory for dinner orders showed that thinking-aloud protocols and 
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designed experiments could uncover the mnemonic associations and retrieval 
structure used to store the information in long-term memory (Ericsson & Polson, 
in press). The empirical evidence indicates that extraordinary memory perfor-
mance is due to acquired memory skill regardless of claims for exceptional 
ability (Ericsson, 1985) . 
When exceptional memory performance is demonstrated by mentally retarded 
subjects, such performance is often assumed to reflect " pure" memorization 
without mediation. From verbal reports of some mentally retarded subjects with 
exceptionally good memories, however , we find evidence that these retarded 
subjects are able to use mnemonics in a manner similar to that of trained memory 
experts. Jones (1926), for instance, analyzed a subjects's (IQ = 75) memoriza-
tion of digits under laboratory control. The following is a verbal protocol taken 
from the subject as he memorized the number 30249385274. It bears a striking 
resemblance to those of our trained digit-span experts. 
30 is the number of days in a month . 249- if that were 149 it would be the 
distance from Chicago to Peoria, Illinois. 385-1 once paid $3.85 railroad fare 
going from Cheyenne, Wyoming to Wheatland , Wyoming. 274- 1 can remember 
that by putting a 6 in front of it for the time being. 6274 is the seating capacity of 
the Hippodrome. (Jones, 1926 , p. 372.) 
On a more general level it appears that most people with remarkable skills are 
surprisingly unable to describe them and the corresponding cognitive processes. 
However, the same subjects are able to give detailed concurrent or retrospective 
verbal reports while performing specific tasks in their domain of expertise . In the 
beginning of this section I raised the question of what performance or ability is 
basic, or at least unmediated by reportable cognitive states. At this time I don't 
know where the boundary will fall , although the documented existence of un-
mediated retrieval and recognition processes provides a lower bound (Ericsson & 
Simon, 1984). The clear importance of mediating cognitive processes in percep-
tual skills and many exceptional abilities in mentally retarded subjects (Ericsson 
& Faivre, in press) shows that many investigators' intuitions about the location 
of such a boundary have been incorrect and require a serious reevaluation . 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter I have shown how data from verbal reports can be represented in 
the same theoretical framework as traditional performance measures, such as 
reaction time and correctness of response. The intermediate states of cognitive 
processes (revealed by encodings of verbal reports) provide detailed descriptions 
of the processes. The claims that certain tests measure specific cognitive pro-
cesses can be empirically evaluated by examining verbally reported thought 
sequences. Drawing on three different areas of research , I have argued for the 
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richness and validity of verbal reports and how the verbal report data have been 
used to change commonly held views of underlying processes. 
The issues of measurement are much broader, and in this final section I 
describe the relevance of protocol analysis to measurement issues. The argu-
ments in this chapter can easily be extended to apply to the central issue of 
understanding the correlation between scores on different tests. Understanding 
what individual tests measure.is a prerequisite for understanding the observed 
correlation between scores on two different tests. Protocol-analysis would allow 
us to evaluate the importance of two different sources of correlation. The first 
possibility is that superior test performance is due to the application of the same 
process or knowledge for both tests. The second and complementary possibility 
is that superior performance on one of the tests is determined by quite different 
processes and knowledge from those of the other test. Accounting for correla-
tions due to the second possibility would require an account much different from 
the first. 
In identifying broad issues of future measurement research, I was very influ-
enced by Gene Glass' (1985) recent critique of current measurement research. 
One of his central arguments was that the information provided by tests was too 
general and measured abilities on such an abstract level that test scores did not 
provide any useful or diagnostic information to educators and the people con-
cerned with remedial training. To describe a subjects' cognitive processes for 
some task requires a lot of information if this description should provide an 
educator with possible incorrect processes and strategies, lack of relevant knowl-
edge, etc. Such an assessment goal is quite different from the traditional mea-
surement of stable capacities or processing characteristics. In the body of my 
chapter I have tried to illustrate how protocol data can supply such information. 
However, the relation between verbally reported knowledge and teachability of 
the corresponding cognitive processes is more complex than it might appear at 
first glance. 
It is clear that uncovering mediational elements in cognitive processes respon-
sible for some superior or inferior performance on a task raises the possibility of 
improving the inferior subjects' performance through instruction. This does not, 
however, imply that subjects following the instruction instantly attain the superi-
or performance of the subjects spontaneously exhibiting that strategy. Further-
more, we know that mediational cognitive processes are involved in many forms 
of expert performance, which can be attained only after years of practice by 
highly motivated students. Hence, stable individual differences in tasks are by no 
means irreconcilable with the existence of mediating cognitive processes. In our 
earlier discussion of memory skill, we showed that normal, motivated subjects 
could obtain exceptional memory performance after 50-100 hours of practice. 
The major obstacle subjects had was the fast presention rate. To deal with the 
limited time available to develop retrieval structures, they needed to speed up 
their encoding processes. This is particularly well-illustrated by our second sub-
ject, who was instructed in the cognitive processes used by our first subject. 
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Given that the second subject was the running partner of the first subject, we can 
assume that his knowledge about running times was comparable. Although the 
second subject improved faster during the initial training, the advantage disap-
peared at a digit span of around 20 digits . This suggests that instruction can 
effectively guide the subject toward the correct sequence of cognitive processes, 
but that acquiring the necessary speed and integration requires practice. In this 
and other respects, mental skills resemble sports and other motor skills. 
In the discussion of individual differences in mathematical ability, we noted 
that global strategies and general heuristics identified by experts did not provide 
a good conceptual system, either for characterization of individual differences or 
for instruction. Much better success was obtained with descriptions using do-
main-specific methods and different types of organization of knowledge. 
The realization that any accurate characterization of individual differences in 
some ability requires a rather detailed description of knowledge and solution 
methods is important, yet somewhat disappointing. It is important because it 
should stimulate a closer collaboration between educators and people involved in 
measurement and assessment. Furthermore, it could lead to the emergence of 
standardized, individualized testing, with thinking aloud for the purpose of spe-
cific assessment of deficiencies as well as computer-based assessment. It is 
disappointing in that the task of measuring generalizable stable individual dif-
ferences appears difficult or even impossible. Differences in available specific 
knowledge and strategies will always confound and cover any basic differences. 
By extracting information about strategies through verbal reports, we will ex-
plicitly address such influence and hence understand better what tests actually 
measure. 
There is, of course, a rather different view, which argues that general indi-
vidual differences are made up of differences in acquired methods and organized 
knowledge. The dramatic improvements after practice on all types of tasks 
(especially simple tasks used to measure basic capacities and processes) appear 
to provide strong support for this emphasis on skill. The research exploring 
effects of extensive practice has shown that practice does not simply make the 
performance quantitatively better but also leads to qualitative changes in perfor-
mance. This means that many abilities assumed to require such structurally 
different characteristics might still be a function of practice- extensive practice. 
Within this skill-based view of individual differences, verbal reports and other 
descriptions of processes , like eye-fixations, will be absolutely essential in al-
lowing us to characterize the components and organization of performance. 
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